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There’s a market growing 
in the United States, but unlike markets 
that trade in tangible commodities, this one 
trades in the absence of something no one 
wants: greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
Hundreds of companies make it possible for 
individuals, organizations, businesses, and even 
events such as rock music festivals to proclaim 
themselves carbon-neutral by paying someone 
else to reduce their emissions. Worried about 
your carbon footprint? No problem. For fees 
of US$2–50 per ton of “avoided emissions,” 
an offset provider will funnel your money into 
an activity or technology that keeps greenhouse 
gases out of the atmosphere. The question is, are 
offset buyers really getting what they paid for? 
The Offset Market
According to the nonprofit Ecosystems 
Market  place, which tracks the green services
T
he idea here is that we can 
use carbon financing to make 
sustainable development 
cost-effective—that way we can 
make real progress on greenhouse 
gas reductions.
—Steve McDougal, 3DegreesT
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industry, the global market for vol-
untary offsets—which don’t count 
toward compliance with mandated 
emissions reductions such as those 
required by the Kyoto Protocol—
more than tripled from 2006 to 
2007, reaching US$331 million. 
This nonregulated “over-the-counter” 
market is accessible to any person, 
business, or group wanting to mini-
mize its carbon footprint; businesses 
accounted for roughly 80% of the 
trade. The over-the-counter mar-
ket is dwarfed by that within a vast 
compliance framework for cutting 
emissions—the Clean Development 
Mechanism  (CDM)—through 
which  companies  bound  to  the 
Kyoto Protocol can purchase off-
sets from projects in the develop-
ing world. Unlike over-the-counter 
purchases, CDM offsets (known as 
“certified emission reductions,” or 
CERs) count toward compliance 
with the Kyoto Protocol’s legally 
binding emission reduction targets. 
According to figures published 
14 January 2009 by the Oslo-based market 
analysis firm Point Carbon, the CDM did 
US$32 billion in CER trade in 2008, more 
than double the previous year’s figure.
 Offset sales in the United States are 
poised to accelerate, assuming a compliance 
framework for regulating greenhouse gases 
emerges to meet President Obama’s climate 
goals. During his address to the bipartisan 
Governors’ Global Climate Summit on 
18 November 2008, then President-Elect 
Obama proposed an 80% reduction in global 
warming emissions by 2050. Offsets already 
play a part in smaller compliance programs 
in the United States. Among them is the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
a cooperative effort among 10 Northeastern 
states that allows utilities to apply offsets 
toward their compliance target of a 10% cut 
in emissions between 2009 and 2018. 
Offset projects can take many forms. They 
might be landfills that capture methane; they 
might be tree farms in the tropics; or 
they might be renewable energy instal-
lations such as wind farms. In order 
for them to be considered viable, offset 
projects must satisfy four key require-
ments: They have to be “additional,” 
meaning they come from activities 
that wouldn’t happen in the absence 
of an offsets incentive; they have to be 
quantifiable, meaning they measurably 
reduce emissions; they have to be per-
manent, meaning the greenhouse gases 
they keep out of the atmosphere won’t 
be released later; and they have to be 
real, meaning they can be verified by 
third-party inspectors.
Yet, mounting evidence shows 
many projects don’t meet these 
requirements, especially that of 
additionality. On 20 October 2008, 
Wall Street Journal reporter Jeffrey 
Ball reported that landfill operators 
across the country were selling off-
sets for methane capture projects 
that had been ongoing for years. 
The landfills in question were selling 
methane for fuel, a lucrative endeav-
or that also happens to be climate-friendly, 
as the carbon dioxide (CO2) released by 
methane combustion is far less dangerous to 
the climate than methane itself. The Cape 
May County Municipal Utilities Author-
ity in New Jersey, which raised $427,475 
from offsets sold in the first nine months 
of 2008 alone, had been selling methane 
for more than a decade. In terms of addi-
tionality, those who bought these offsets 
contributed nothing to further emissions 
Countries Purchasing Offsets to Meet  
Mandated Emissions Reductions
Source: Capoor K, Ambrosi P. 2008. State and trends of the carbon market 2008. 
Washington, DC: World Bank; p. 25.
Shares of volumes purchased, 2007
O
ffsets are a new concept, and they’re not well understood. What we’re 
seeing is progress toward a healthy market that for the moment has 
to police itself, but which is probably headed toward more regulation 
as the United States enters a compliance system for greenhouse gas reductions. 
If we don’t have an offset market, it’s really going to hamper our long-term 
ability to deal with climate change. 
—David Antinioli, Clean Air-Cool PlanetT
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reductions since the utility’s methane 
capture system was implemented far 
in advance of any likely intention to 
sell offsets. 
David Victor, who directs the 
program on energy and sustainable 
development at Stanford University’s 
Freeman Spogli Institute for Interna-
tional Studies, claims CDM offsets are 
“mostly bogus.” In “A Realistic Policy 
on International Carbon Offsets,” a 
working paper issued in April 2008, 
Victor and coauthor Michael Wara, 
a research fellow and lecturer at Stan-
ford Law School, described their inves-
tigation into industrial energy projects 
in China—such as new hydro, wind, 
and natural gas plants—which account 
for the vast majority of CER credits 
issued today. According to their inves-
tigation, most of these projects have 
applied for approval under the CDM, 
which would make them eligible for 
payments from Kyoto signatories, 
even though China’s latest five-year 
economic plan calls for major invest-
ments in alternative energy to shift the 
country away from coal. 
“Taken collectively . . . these indi-
vidual applications for credit amount 
to a claim that the hydro, wind, and 
natural gas elements of the power sec-
tor in China would not be growing 
at all without help from CDM,” the 
authors wrote. “This broader impli-
cation is simply implausible in light 
of [China’s] state policies.” The spe-
cific concern, the Stanford researchers 
noted, is that China’s energy projects 
don’t meet requirements for “regula-
tory additionality.” In other words, 
the projects are already required by 
regulation and would thus proceed 
even without offset funding. Says Vic-
tor, “What we see here are energy dev-
el  opers [in China] who have become 
quite clever when it comes to filling out 
the right forms to get CDM credit.” 
A similar conclusion was reached by 
the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) in the November 2008 report 
International Climate Change Programs: 
Lessons Learned from the European 
Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme and 
the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism, which stated that offsets 
under the Kyoto Protocol had yielded 
“uncertain” effects on greenhouse 
emissions, with “limited” contributions to 
sustainable technology development. The 
report further stated that “some offset credits 
were awarded for projects that would have 
occurred even in the absence of the CDM, 
despite a rigorous screening process.” 
Regulation Versus Market  
Certification
Findings such as these have put policy 
stakeholders on alert. The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), which 
investigates cases of market deception, 
warns that offsets carry a high risk of 
fraud, according to Jim Kohm, asso-
ciate director of enforcement in the 
commission’s Bureau of Consumer 
Protection. Kohm says buyers should 
be wary of double-counting, in which 
developers sell multiple offsets for a 
single project. “We sue people for 
that,” he says. 
The challenge, Kohm adds, is that 
people buy offsets on faith. “Offsets 
are not like products that you can 
touch or feel,” he says. “I might sell 
you an offset for planting a tree, but 
how do you know that I haven’t also 
sold that offset to someone else?” But 
Kohm also says the FTC’s concerns 
don’t extend beyond double-counting 
to additionality unless sellers make 
false claims that their projects are addi-
tional when they aren’t. 
As for entities such as the landfill 
utilities described in the Wall Street 
Journal article, Kohm claims they 
could only be accused of fraud if they 
had intentionally misled consumers. 
“Under the FTC Act you can sell an 
offset that isn’t additional without 
breaking the law as long as you are 
clear about what you are selling,” he 
explains. “You could say, ‘I’m selling 
you an offset, but it’s not additional.’” 
He says the FTC has yet to prosecute a 
single case of offset fraud but wouldn’t 
comment as to whether any such cases 
are in the FTC’s investigative pipeline. 
Part of the problem, asserted the 
GAO in an August 2008 report, The 
U.S. Voluntary Market Is Growing, 
but Quality Assurance Poses Chal-
lenges for Market Participants, is that 
although federal agencies supply some 
con  sumer protection and technical 
assistance in this area, “no single regu-
latory body [in the United States] has 
oversight responsibilities [for the over-
the-counter offset market].”
In place of a centralized regulatory 
framework for offsets, a number of 
independent, market-based standards 
have emerged to impose a measure of 
honesty and integrity on the business. 
The Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), 
for instance, was created in 2005 by The 
Climate Group, the International Emissions 
   
Where Are Offset Projects Taking Place?
Share of volumes supplied by project location, 
CDM projects, 2007
Growth in share of volumes by project 
location, CDM projects, 2002–2007
Adapted from: Hamilton K, Sjardin M, Marcello T, Xu G. 2008. 
Forging a frontier: state of the voluntary carbon markets 2008. San 
Francisco, CA: Ecosystem Marketplace; p. 7.
Transaction volume by project location,  
over-the-counter projects, 2007
Asia    39%
North America    27%
Europe and Russia    13%
Australia      7%
Latin America      7%
Other      5%
Africa      2% 
Source: Capoor K, Ambrosi P. 2008. State and trends of the carbon 
market 2008. Washington, DC: World Bank; p. 27.T
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Trading Association, and the World 
Economic Forum to ensure that offsets 
in the voluntary market are additional 
and permanent. To qualify for VCS 
approval, projects must pass inspec-
tion by third-party verifiers. Approved 
projects can issue tradable offset cred-
its known as Voluntary Carbon Units.   
Those who champion offsets claim 
consumers can avoid nonviable pur-
chases if they buy from sellers that 
work through market-based certifica-
tion programs. David Antinioli, chief 
executive officer of the Voluntary Car-
bon Standard Association, which man-
ages the VCS program, stresses that 
society can and should have faith in 
market instruments. For example, the 
Center for Resource Solutions (CRS), 
a San Francisco–based nonprofit orga-
nization that certifies products sold 
by companies in the green energy 
sector, bills itself as an organization 
that helps offset buyers know exactly 
what they’re purchasing. Certifica-
tion standards by independent, out-
side organizations such as the VCS, 
Gold Standard, and the CRS Green-e 
Climate program seek to ensure that 
projects are real, additional, quantifi-
able, and permanent, and help buyers 
select offsets that aren’t being double-
sold or offered by companies making 
misleading claims, says Jeff Swenerton, 
commun  ications director at the CRS. 
Bill Burtis, manager of commu-
nications and special projects for the 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire–based 
environmental group Clean Air-Cool 
Planet, adds that the VCS and other 
standard-setting organizations are 
“doing good, hard work to move this 
system forward in a sustainable way.” 
He adds, “Offsets are a new concept, 
and they’re not well understood. 
What we’re seeing is progress toward 
a healthy market that for the moment 
has to police itself, but which is prob-
ably headed toward more regulation as 
the United States enters a compliance 
system for greenhouse gas reductions. 
If we don’t have an offset market, it’s really 
going to hamper our long-term ability to 
deal with climate change.” 
Nevertheless, at the same time that regu-
lators and certification groups are addressing 
questions of fraud, the offset market can be 
seen as holding the climate hostage, demand-
ing payment before emissions are reduced. 
Steve McDougal, executive vice president 
of marketing and business development at 
offset provider 3Degrees, acknowledges this 
is a “strange dynamic.” But he suggests the 
market can sort out these issues. 
“It’s a difficult thing, no doubt,” McDou-
gal says. “But we’re encouraged when we see 
carbon financing make a project feasible. The 
idea here is that we can use carbon financing 
to make sustainable development cost-effec-
tive—that way we can make real progress on 
greenhouse gas reductions.” Indeed, despite 
gloomy assessments from Stanford 
University and the GAO, not to men-
tion a barrage of negative press reports 
warning of fraud, some market experts 
believe offsets can play an important 
role in fighting climate change. 
Explaining the Nuts and Bolts
Offsets have their roots in the Kyoto 
Protocol, which came into force 
16 February 2005. As part of the 
protocol, signatories agree to cap 
greenhouse gas emissions generated 
by participating countries. Industry 
sectors within those economies are 
given or sold emissions “allowanc-
es,” which they can trade to reach 
specified reduction targets. This “cap-
and-trade” system—now the world’s 
dominant market approach for fight-
ing anthropogenic climate change—
is also embraced by RGGI in the 
United States. Moreover, the West-
ern Climate Initiative, another North 
American regional coalition, plans to 
establish a cap-and-trade program to 
meet its climate goals. The Western 
Climate Initiative encompasses the 
states of Arizona, California, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Wash-
ington and the Canadian provinces of 
British Columbia and Manitoba.
Allowances under any cap-and-
trade program are distributed by their 
constituent regulated economies. For 
instance, under the Kyoto Protocol, 
allowances are either sold, given away, 
or auctioned by the countries that 
signed the treaty, or in the case of the 
European Union, by the Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Trading Scheme. 
To understand how offsets and 
allowances differ, one first needs to 
understand how cap-and-trade works. 
Here’s a simplified explanation: Assume 
the combined annual emissions from 
a hypothetical participating economy 
comprising 10 greenhouse gas emitters 
is capped at 10 tons per year. Under a 
cap-and-trade system, the government 
of that economy might issue each 
emitter an annual emissions allowance of 
1 ton. Now, let’s say one of those emitters, 
Company X, knows it will generate 2 tons 
of carbon dioxide. To reach its mandated 
1-ton target, Company X can either reduce 
emissions (for example, by making opera-
tions more efficient or using cleaner fuels), 
or it can buy an allowance from Company Y, 
whose emissions, in this hypothetical world, 
are zero. If that allowance costs less than 
Types of Offset Projects
Growth by project type, CDM projects, 2002–2007
Share of volumes supplied by project type,  
CDM projects, 2007
Abbreviations: CMM = coal mine methane; EE = energy effi-
ciency; HFC = hydrofluorocarbons; LFG = landfill gas; N2O = 
nitrous oxide; waste mng’t = waste management. “N2O” refers 
to abatement of nitrous oxide released from plants producing 
nitric acid (used in fertilizer). “Fugitive” refers to projects that 
capture escaping emissions from fuels. “Fuel switching” refers 
to adoption of new fuels for industrial processes.
Source: Capoor K, Ambrosi P. 2008. State and trends of the carbon market 
2008. Washington, DC: World Bank; p. 29.T
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the price of new plant modifications, 
Company X has a money-saving oppor-
tunity—it can buy Company Y’s allow-
ance and keep what it otherwise would 
have spent on plant upgrades. Compa-
ny Y, meanwhile, has the opportunity 
to profit from its investment in clean 
technology.
In the event that allowances under 
a cap-and-trade system become too 
expensive—perhaps because officials 
tighten the emissions cap—emitters 
bound to mandated reductions can 
buy cheaper offsets from projects else-
where in the world. But given that 
cap-and-trade systems aim to pro-
mote cleaner technology at home, and 
because allowances can be measured 
and verified more easily than offset proj-
ects, cap-and-trade programs typically limit 
the number of offsets companies can buy. 
RGGI, for instance, limits offset purchases 
to 10% or less of compliance obligations. 
Questions over Forestry
Of all the types of offset schemes available, 
those involving forest resources, particularly 
in tropical countries, have raised some of 
the most challenging issues. CO2 emissions 
from tropical deforestation and wood burn-
ing account for 17.3% of greenhouse gas 
releases to the atmosphere, according to a 
report in the 18 May 2007 issue of Science. 
That’s slightly more than the global road 
transportation sector, as calculated in the 
8 December 2008 issue of JAMA. For that 
reason, efforts to fight global warming must 
consider forestry, says Janet Peace, vice pres-
ident of markets and business strategy at the 
Pew Center on Global Change. But regulators 
disagree as to which forestry practices meet 
the criteria for viable offset projects. 
The CDM allows for two types of forestry 
offsets: reforestation of previously harvested 
areas and afforestation, or tree planting where 
forests haven’t existed for at least 50 years. 
A third type of offset, avoided deforestation, 
deals with efforts to stop tree harvesting or 
clearing that would otherwise occur. How-
ever, the CDM does not include avoided 
deforestation activities. One reason for this is 
that when the Kyoto Protocol was first drafted, 
methodologies and cost-effective technolo-
gies for establishing baseline tropical forest 
cover and for monitoring forestry practices 
over time were not sufficiently developed, 
explains Toby Janson-Smith, senior director 
for forest carbon markets at Conservation 
International, an environmental group based 
in Arlington, Virginia. Without solid baseline 
and project-monitoring data and method-
ologies, policy makers weren’t confident in 
their ability to confirm that swaths of 
forest supposedly protected by offsets 
would have otherwise been cut down 
or to account for the number of carbon 
credits being claimed. 
Today, thanks to advances in 
remote sensing and satellite imaging, 
and the emergence of new carbon 
accounting methodologies, those base-
lines and project practices can now be 
accurately documented and monitored, 
Janson-Smith says. Given that, he adds, 
policy makers are now working out 
how they might include avoided defor-
estation as an acceptable offset activity 
in the second Kyoto Protocol commit-
ment period that begins in 2013. 
But consensus on how forest off-
sets should be applied is scarce. RGGI, for 
instance, only credits local forest offsets from 
within states participating in the initiative. A 
Legislative Discussion Draft issued 7 Octo-
ber 2008 by John Dingell (D–MI) and Rick 
Boucher (D–VA) limits its proposed off-
sets to afforestation and reforestation only. 
And Green-e Climate doesn’t endorse any of 
the CDM’s forestry offsets. Jane Valentino, 
who manages the Green-e Climate program, 
says that’s because the CDM’s executive 
board views forestry offsets as temporary, 
“which makes sense for a compliance mar-
ket, because the onus is on regulated entities 
to make sure that if a forest burns down, 
they’ll go buy another offset to replace it,” 
she explains. “But that doesn’t work for a 
voluntary market, because you can’t expect 
consumers to continue checking to make 
sure the forests are still there.” 
Green-e Climate circumvents this par-
ticular problem by endorsing only forestry 
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Transaction volume by project type,
over-the-counter projects, 2007
Renewable energy    31%
Energy efficiency    18%
Forestry    18%
Methane destruction    16%
Fuel switching      9%
Mixed      5%
Industrial gas destruction      2%
Geological sequestration       1%   
Adapted from: Hamilton K, Sjardin M, Marcello T, Xu G. 2008. 
Forging a frontier: state of the voluntary carbon markets 2008. 
San Francisco, CA: Ecosystem Marketplace; p. 7.
T
hrough forest offsets, we can sustain the poor, prevent species loss, 
and slow climate change all at the same time. We’re losing fifty 
thousand square miles of tropical forest every year. Carbon financing 
is one of the only ways we can turn the tide on deforestation; there simply 
isn’t funding to do it otherwise. 
—Toby Janson-Smith, Conservation InternationalA 68  v o l u m e  117 | n u m b e r  2 | February 2009  •  Environmental Health Perspectives
Focus | Carbon Offsets
credits that have been certified by the VCS. 
Under the VCS system, forest projects are 
assessed to determine the likelihood that 
their stored carbon could be lost in the 
future. Offset credits from higher-risk proj-
ects (those with greater potential for future 
deforestation) are split into two portions. 
One portion is sold, while the rest is depos-
ited into a pooled buffer account adminis-
tered by the VCS. That way, the amount of 
carbon sequestered within a higher-risk for-
est exceeds the tons of carbon offsets sold for 
its protection to the buyer. As sales of forest 
offsets grow, so does the size of the risk pool, 
which covers the carbon lost if a protected 
forest is burned or harvested.  
Janson-Smith says forestry offsets have 
value beyond slowing climate change. “More 
than 80% of the world’s poor depend on 
forest resources for their survival,” he says. 
“With every acre of forest lost, these local 
communities are further marginalized. And 
tropical forests contain most of the world’s 
threatened plants and animals. So through 
forest offsets, we can sustain the poor, pre-
vent species loss, and slow climate change all 
at the same time. We’re losing fifty thousand 
square miles of tropical forest every year. 
Carbon financing is one of the only ways we 
can turn the tide on deforestation; there sim-
ply isn’t funding to do it otherwise.”
Offsets in U.S. Climate Change Policy
It’s still unclear how offsets could factor 
into a national cap-and-trade system for the 
United States. S. 2191, the Climate Security 
Act of 2007, spearheaded by Joseph Lieber-
man (I–CT) and John Warner (R–VA), 
would have limited offset purchases under 
its proposed cap-and-trade plan to 30%, 
half from domestic projects and half from 
projects overseas. The bill failed to pass 
the Senate over persistent questions about 
cost containment, according to Peace. The 
Dingell–Boucher Discussion Draft issued 
in October limits offsets to just 5% of com-
pliance obligations, split between domestic 
and international projects. But Dingell and 
Boucher’s offset fraction also grows as the 
emissions cap becomes increasingly stringent. 
A tightening cap would drive allowance 
costs higher, making the cheaper offsets 
increasingly useful, some legislators believe. 
Given questions over offset reliability and the 
potential that investing in far-flung projects 
would deny local populations the health ben-
efits of cleaner technology, fights over offsets 
in climate change policy are already erupting 
on Capitol Hill, says Emily Figdor, the fed-
eral global warming program director for the 
advocacy group Environment America. 
At the same time, James Hansen, for-
mer head of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration’s Goddard Institute 
for Space Studies, and a leading advocate 
for climate change legislation, has reject-
ed emissions trading altogether in favor of 
a carbon tax. In an open letter delivered 
on 29 December 2008 to then President-
Elect Obama and his wife, Hansen and wife 
Anniek described cap-and-trade schemes as 
“ineffectual and not commensurate with the 
climate threat.” What’s needed instead, the 
Hansens insisted, are moratoriums on coal 
plants that don’t capture and sequester CO2, 
a carbon tax set by governments that rises 
over time, and “fourth-generation” nuclear 
power plants that burn their own waste. 
The Hansens are not alone in rejecting 
offsets. In the 24 January 2009 issue of New 
Scientist, environmentalist James Lovelock, 
who proposed the “Gaia hypothesis” that the 
Earth constitutes a single superorganism, said, 
“Carbon trading, with its huge government 
subsidies, is just what finance and industry 
wanted. It’s not going to do a damn thing 
about climate change, but it’ll make a lot of 
money for a lot of people and postpone the 
moment of reckoning.” As for what he does 
see as an answer to climate change, Lovelock 
said, “There is one way we could save our-
selves and that is through the massive burial 
of charcoal. It would mean farmers turning 
all their agricultural waste—which contains 
carbon that the plants have spent the summer 
sequestering—into nonbiodegradable char-
coal and burying it in the soil. Then you can 
start shifting really hefty quantities of carbon 
out of the system and pull the CO2 down 
quite fast.” [For more on this technology, 
see “Biochar: Carbon Mitigation from the 
Ground Up,” p. A70 this issue.] 
The imperative, stresses Lewis Milford, 
president of the Clean Energy Group, a 
Vermont firm that seeks to accelerate the 
renewable energy market, is that any focus 
on offsets not slow the development of 
breakthrough technologies needed to reverse 
climate change quickly. Milford says carbon 
pricing—either through cap-and-trade or a 
direct tax on carbon—may not do enough to 
spur new technology. 
“We’re seeing a consensus that cap-and-
trade won’t generate the kind of high prices on 
carbon that we need [to drive policy change], 
especially given political challenges and the 
current state of the economy,” Milford says. 
“If you’re looking at this from the perspective 
of needing breakthrough, expensive systems—
for instance carbon capture and storage, or 
advances in solar energy—I don’t think incre-
mental price incentives are going to get you 
there. We need technology programs and sig-
nificant public investments. Cap-and-trade 
could have some value, but it’s likely to be 
limited if carbon prices stay low and volatile.”
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